Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts by Epstein, David G
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 59 | Issue 1 Article 14
1968
Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts
David G. Epstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
David G Epstein, Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts, 59 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 148 (1968)
Tn JounN.,L or CmriNeAL LAw, CRIINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE Vol. 59, No. I
Copyright © 1968 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
THE POLICE ROLE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS*
DAVID G. EPSTEIN
Major David G. Epstein is a member of the staff of the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort
Gordon, Georgia. Major Epstein graduated from Michigan State University School of Police Admin-
istration, and served during 1965 and 1966 in Viet-Nam as a military police company commander,
operations officer of a military police battalion, and administrative assistant to the Provost Marshal of
U.S. Army Viet-Nam.-EmToR.
Through its ability to shield, supply, finance, and
reenforce the insurgent, the population of any
given area holds the key to the success of any
insurgency movement within that area. This fact
has formed the foundation of the insurgent move-
ments guided by (among others) Mao Tse Tung',
Vo Nguyen Giap2, and Che Guevera3.
The first steps then for any insurgent to take are
those that will insure him a welcome within the
mass of the people. The insurgent will employ a
variety of tactics to gain this indispensable sup-
port of the population. These tactics generally can
be labeled "persuasion," "favors," and "force."
* This article does not necessarily represent an
official military point of view, but rather the private
view of the author.
1 "Especially in guerrilla combat, we must rely on
the force of the popular masses, for it is only thus that
we can have a guarantee of success. The support of the
masses offers us great advantages as regards transport,
assistance to wounded, intelligence, disruption of the
enemy's position.... At the same time the enemy can
be put into an isolated position thus further increasing
our advantages. If, by misfortune, we are defeated it
will also be possible to escape or find concealment.
Consequently, we must not lightly give battle in
places where the masses are not organized and linked
to us."
MAO TsE TUNG, BASIC TACTICS translated by Stuart
R. Schram, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger Pub-
lishers, 1966) pp. 57-8.
2 "The Viet Nam People's Army has always seen to
establishing and maintaining good relations with the
people. These are based upon the identity of their
aims of struggle, in fact, the people and the Army are
together in the fight against the enemy to save the
Fatherland and insure the full success of the task of
liberating the nation and the working class. The people
are to the Army what water is to the fish, as the saying
goes. And this saying has a profound significance!"
Vo NGUYEN GIAP, PEOPLE'S WAR PEoPiE's Asuy
(New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1962) p.
56.
a "Popular support is indispensable. Let us consider
the example of robber bands that roam a certain region.
They possess all the characteristics of a guerrilla band,
homogeneity, respect for their leader, familiarity with
the terrain, and frequently even thorough understand-
ing of tactics. They lack only one thing: the support of
the people. And inevitably, these bands are caught and
wiped out by police forces."
Can GuxvERA, ON GUERRILLA W~nsAnn (New
York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1962) pp. 667.
The "persuasion" tactic is nothing new. It is
practiced by every political party in existence in
our own country, but with the exception of the
lunatic fringe extremist groups of both left and
right, certainly not with as much fanaticism and
fervor. The persuasive act may be a speech, a
pamphlet, a poster, a school, and more likely a
combination of these aspects and others as well.
The "favor" tactic is also a page out of the
political book. The ham on Christmas Day, a job
cutting grass in the city park, the paving of the
sidewalk in front of the house, all have their
counterpart acts perpetrated by insurgents every-
where they are in existence today.
"Force" as a political tactic has not been an
unknown quantity on the non-revolutionary
political scene either. In an insurgency situation
the aspect of force is more blunt, systematic,
universal, and terroristic. The insurgent will, as a
matter of course, assassinate conspicuous quantities
of government officials. These acts serve two pur-
poses. Efficient props of the government adminis-
trative system are eliminated thereby weakening
the government's local control, and by demonstrat-
ing that not even government officials are safe, the
support the people were formerly willing to provide
the government is eroded. The insurgent also
applies pressure directly on the people to enlist
active physical, financial, and intelligence support
while (at the same time) depriving the government
of these assets.
The insurgent in the preparation stage is much
more terrorist than warrior. He plots and attempts
to carry out murder, extortion, arson, robbery, and
kidnapping. This stage of insurgency is one that
the police are best suited to combat. Only after the
haven within the population is prepared and the
government is weakened by small acts of terror will
the larger insurgent units emerge.
INTELLIGENCE
The police intelligence system adapted to rooting
out the non-political criminal can easily turn its
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attention to the political criminal. At least one
successful counterinsurgency effort found that the
police were uniquely suited to perform the interl-
gence function. A high ranking British government
official active in the Malayan guerrilla "emergency"
and later head of the British advisory team to
Vietnam stated the following:
'Ideally there should be one single organization
responsible for all security intelligence within the
country.
"The best organization to be responsible for all
internal security intelligence is the special branch
of the police force rather than a completely separate
organization-The police force is a state organiza-
tion reaching out into every corner of the country
and will have had long experience of close contact
with the population." 4
just as the criminal often attempts to buy the
policeman so will the insurgent attempt to subvert
the policeman. The method used to combat internal
criminal subversion is the same that combats
internal political subversion by insurgents, and
such method must become a part of the police
intelligence effort.
PATROL
Police patrol remains the axis around which the
police operation rotates. A patrol in an insurgent
situation retains the same principles as guided the
function in a peacetime context. If anything, the
function expands. For instance, semi-rural and
rural areas may have been at the bottom of the
crime frequency spectrum before the insurgency
began to develop, but due to the emphasis the
insurgent may place on these areas the police
presence will have to be dramatically increased
therein.
Other items on the patrol checklist will also
have to change. Equipment will have to be
modified. Items as automatic weapons, armored
cars, and light aircraft may have to be added to
the inventory. The police will also have to retrain
themselves to react to different alarm triggers. The
stranger in a village or on a street, the bicycle
parked next to a public building (does it contain a
bomb?) the small printing shop in a basement, all
previously no cause for speculation now may be
causes for concern.
Selective enforcement previously dictated a set
4 THomPsoN, SIR ROBERT, DEFEATING COMMUNIST
INSURGENCY (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Pub-
lisher, 1966) p. 85.
of patrol reaction patterns. Selective enforcement
guidelines will now have to absorb facts arising
from the insurgency situation. The area of the
cities containing government buildings may previ-
ously have been almost a negligible factor in po-
lice patrol problems. In an insurgent atmosphere
it becomes an area of prime attention for police
patrols. At the same time the police battle against
crime must continue or situations such as presently
disturbing the Philippines will arise.'
REsouRcEs AND POPULATION CONTROL
The control of the population and material
resources of a nation in order to prevent these
assets from being used by the insurgent will be a
police responsibility.
Entire populations of a region must be registered
and identified by the police. The police must then
recheck at irregular intervals and in varying
locations the composition and placement of the
population. All additions and deletions from this
population must be registered with the police.
The government must set controls on acquisi-
tion, possession, and disposition of items deemed
to be relevant to the insurgent war effort. Anti-
biotic drugs, chemical components of explosives,
and food (as examples) must be strictly controlled.
The police, through routine and surprise checks,
would enforce these controls. Such controls would
permit the apprehension of an individual with
four vials of an antibiotic, if proper documentation
were not present, and it would legitimately extend
police investigative action to the farmer who only
presents half of his normal and expected crop for
market.
RIOTS
The insurgent will attempt to ignite riots of the
utmost severity in an effort to dislodge or discredit
the government. Again, the police are the first
line of defense. Specially trained riot police with
specialized equipment are often completely capable
of crushing any disturbance the insurgents can
mount. Close liaison must be maintained with
regular army or militia units in an area, so that the
police can be supplemented by these troops when
6Surging lawlessness has spawned a crime wave that
has turned the Philippines into a kind of Dodge City
East, where just about everybody packs a pistol and
news of muggings and murders, crowds most other
stories off the front pages of the newspapers. Not sur-
prisingly in this climate, the far leftists are making
more converts. "The Philippines", Tnu MAGAZINE,
June 2, 1967, Vol 89, No. 22, page 24.
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necessary. It is up to the police to encourage, and
if necessary provide, the proper training for such
troops.
The Military Police, who are fully cognizant of
both police and military operations, can serve as
the connecting link between police and military
commands. In deciding when to utilize troops the
police should follow a guideline of "too much too
soon." Power to be overwhelming without blood-
shed, must be applied early in the game.
THE LAW
Laws providing the police with emergency
powers must be enacted. The police must never
act outside of the law nor should the government
allow the police to ignore any portion of the law.
Sir Robert Thompson quotes from his experience
in Malaya. "There is a very strong temptation in
dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla
actions for government forces to act outside the
law, the excuses being that the processes of law
are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in
the law for the individual are not designed for an
insurgency, and that a terrorist deserves to be
treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this
morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create
more practical difficulties for a government than
it solves. A government which does not act in ac-
cordance with the law forfeits the right to be called
a government and cannot expect its people to
obey the law." 6
EXPANSION OF THE PoLIcE
Very obviously, the police problem in terms of
areas of concern alone will multiply. Crime likely
will not slacken during an insurgency. Rather, the
people must be provided with better police pro-
tection from criminal elements than ever before.
Military manpower requirements will also increase.
The police will be faced with increasing problems
and diminishing resources. Very possible then,
police recruiting standards will have to be revised
downwards to obtain sufficient personnel. This
will come at a time when a higher quality police-
man will be required, due to the extraordinary
powers granted the police, and due to the problems
at hand. Should police operations become brutal,
dishonest or incompetent, the support of the
people will be lost.
The police, then, are faced with a situation that
requires a more competent policeman due to con-
8 THoiusoN op. cit., p. 52.
tinuing crime and heretofore nonexistent insurgent
problems, but because of the manpower demands
of these very same problems, the standards of ad-
mission to the police ranks must be lowered.
The answer to the problem lies in leadership,
training, and discipline. The police leadership corps
must be of impeccably high quality. If a basis for
this quality has not been laid for many years past
in high initial selection standards, then a page
from the military, that of lateral entrance of
officers, will have to be borrowed. The training
program must under all circumstances be thorough.
A 50 percent savings in training time can produce a
professional cripple for half a decade. Discipline
must become almost draconion. All infractions of
discipline must be dealt with severely. Violations
of a serious nature should be cause for dismissal
and possible court actions.
PoLicE FIELD UNITs
Provisions must be made for the formation of
units designed to track and pursue the insurgent
to any refuge he may have within the country.
Often enough, this refuge will be in isolated rural
locations well protected by natural and man-made
obstacles and by armed and determined men. The
units that must undertake this task of ferreting out
the insurgent should be organized along small unit
infantry lines and be trained in infantry tactics.
The police must have possession of several such
units in each area for which they are responsible so
that speed and continuity will be a positive factor
of their counter-insurgency operations. There is a
further value in making light search and pursuit
tasks of an infantry nature at least a partial police
responsibility. That is, the police skills inherent to
such a unit may often require employment in such
tasks.
An example of such requirements can be taken
from the Huk revolt in the Philippines where, after
an ambush, guerrillas were thought to have taken
refuge in a nearby village. A Philippine Army de-
tachment surrounded the village and began to
interrogate the villagers. "All those interrogated
denied the presence of any guerrillas when the
screening began. By chance, as it was not a stand-
ard item carried by Armed Forces, the officer (in
charge) had a paraffin test kit borrowed from
friends in the Manila Police Department. All able
bodied males were put through the paraffin test
... three people out of about seventy-five tested
as positive. As the three were being marched off
[Vol. 59
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to the vehicles that would carry them to camp, they
suddenly bolted. A guard fired and killed one." 
7
CENTRALIZED CONTROL
A centralized planning and command system
which will control the police on a nationwide basis
must be instituted where not already present.
Problems inherent in decentralized control such as
jurisdictional limitations and communications
barriers must be eliminated if counterinsurgency
actions are to succeed. The right hand must know
what the left is doing. The benefits of economy of
force and finances where the air is quite, and the
concentration of force and finances where the storm
rages, can only be realized with a strong central
controlling force directly responsive to require-
ments presented by the insurgency problem as a
whole.
PuBLIc RELATIONS
Public relations becomes extremely important
in insurgent situations. It is a subject to which the
police must give increased attention as compared to
public relations in a noninsurgent context. The
demand for increased emphasis arises from the
conscious planned effort made by the insurgent to
discredit all agencies of the legal government,
particularly the police. The insurgent will make
this effort of discreditation both by word and by
deed. The words will point out and expand any
weakness found in the police structure and any
mistake or impropriety committed by individual
policemen. The deeds will consist of performing for
the population those services not received from, but
expected of police and in righting real or imagined
wrongs perpetrated by the police. For example, a
local gang of hoodlums preying on merchants may
be eliminated by insurgents with pointed references
to the inefficiency of the police. If there is a corrupt
7 VALERIANo, CoLroNL NiA1oIAlA D., AiN BorrAN-
NAN, LT. COL. CaARLEs T. R., COUNTERN SURGENCY
OPERATIoNs, THE PLiPINE EXpERENCE, (New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1962) p. 165
or tyrannical police agent in the area he may be
assassinated by the insurgents as a "public serv-
ice." Other corrupt police or government officials
may be left unharmed as living examples of govern-
ment perfidy. The police must expand their public
service and information service with the view of
winning friends and influencing people. If the police
must expand into operational areas not tradition-
ally looked upon as police concerns such as social
relief, the justification for such a move can easily
be found in the objective sought.
The police must be trained to look upon them-
selves as being of the people and for the people.
The sometimes understandable feeling prevalent
in policemen that "its them against us" must be
avoided at all costs. When the police become
alienated from the population and they are treated
as enemies, the cause has been lost. During World
War II, for example, !'when the Germans em-
barked on stamping out the (Russian guerrilla)
bands by terror methods, they only fanned the fire
and number of bands multiplied." 8
A Ponr TO REmNmm
Though the insurgent may be a terrorist and a
guerrilla, though he may engage in robbery, kid-
napping, and murder, and though many of the
methods used to stop him are police methods used
to combat criminals, the police must not allow
themselves to think of such a man as a common
outlaw. He most often is not that. He is a man
fighting for what he considers to be an ideal, and
he will fight to the death for the ideal. The battle
against the insurgent must be fought on this level.
The police must meet this revolutionary fervor
with a response calculated to show the actual
emptiness of the ideal this man fights for. If ever
police professionalism will be tested, it will be in
such situations.
8 DiXON, BRIGADIER C. AuaRFY AND HEiLBRUM,
OTTo, CoMUUNIsT GuERLLA WA1ARE (New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1955) p. 99.
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